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Transformative Constitutions and Constitutionalism: A New Theory and School of
Jurisprudence from the Global South?
Willy Mutunga

Abstract
The article seeks to interrogate, historicize, and problematize what transformative constitutions
and their attendant constitutionalism/jurisprudence are. Some of the critical elements of
transformative constitutions are analyzed as well as the development of the jurisprudence that is
emerging from these constitutions. In the quest for an answer to the question posed, which is the
title of the article, Kenya is used as a case-study. Kenya has had a transformative constitution
since it was promulgated on 27 August 2010. Its core elements/pillars of transformation are
highlighted in this article. Kenya’s experience with the implementation of this Constitution,
particularly with regard to the development of jurisprudence to reflect the objectives and vision
of the Constitution will assist in answering the question examined in the article. The question
itself is of interest to both the Global South and Global North in the ongoing process of reverse
learning.1 The analysis is therefore linked to the global context in the quest for political
transformation of which the making of constitutions is an integral part.

I

Introduction

A South African scholar,2 and a former Chief Justice of South Africa,3 respectively, have defined
what it is, and written about transformative constitution and constitutionalism in South Africa in
a way that is relevant to this article. Transformative constitutions and their
jurisprudence/constitutionalism collectively capture the idea of fundamental societal change
through the instrumentality of law, especially the law of the constitution.4 The role of law in
social transformation has a long genealogy when posed and answered as a question about

 Chief Justice & President of the Supreme Court, Kenya, 2011-2016; I acknowledge the comments of Professors
Issa Shivji, Karim Hirji, Yash Tandon, James Gathii, Joel Ngugi, and Duncan Okello on earlier drafts of this article.
1Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, Law and Society in Latin America: A New Map (New York: Routledge, 2015), 8-9.
2
See K.E. Klare, “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism”, (1998) 14:1 South African J on Human
Rights 146.
3
Pius Langa, “Transformative Constitutionalism”, (2006) 17:3 Stellenbosch L Rev 351.
4
Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights: adjudication under a transformative constitution (South Africa:
JUTA, 2010), at 24-25.
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whether law and the courts can advance, stagnate or impede transformation and revolution.5 This
question, once the source of serious and continuous jurisprudential debates, has acquired a
consensus that law, indeed, has a role to play in societal transformation and revolution. This
multi-disciplinary consensus is shared by lawyers, economists, policy makers, politicians,
international organizations, and think tanks.
In gaining traction, the new phenomenon of transformative constitutionalism6 has both enriched
and transformed the way we see constitutions. Underpinning the very idea of a transformative
constitution (such as those of India, Colombia, South Africa, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, and
Kenya) is the idea that the constitutional superstructure is embedded in a theory that it will be an
instrument for the transformation of society rather than a historical, economic, and socio-political
pact to preserve the status quo.7

As the discussion on the elements of transformative constitution and constitutionalism will show,
transformative constitutions depend fundamentally on how political leadership implement it.
Thus the intellectual, ideological, social, cultural, spiritual, and political position of leadership is
important. Political leadership can either consolidate the main pillars of the constitution whilst
rescuing its weaknesses; or destroy, overthrow and/or systematically subvert it over time. In
terms of the development of jurisprudence, the idea of transformative judicial politics under a
constitution that is transformative is also important. Social struggles even within the judiciary
and outside it impact the objectives of transformative constitutions either negatively or
positively. Ultimately, the core question to be interrogated is whether transformative
constitutions, under the implementation of a radical transformative political leadership, can be
the basis for a society that rescues the limitations of transformative constitutions. In other words,
5

In my doctoral thesis, Relational Contract Outside National Jurisdiction (1993), Doctor of Jurisprudence Thesis at
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, I attempt to problematize the various schools of jurisprudence,
including the Marxist Theory of State and Law.
6 Willy Mutunga, “Human Rights States and Societies: A Reflection from Kenya” (2015) 2:1 The Transnational
Human Rights 63. See note 15 for its recent version.
7 See for example Gargarella, Roberto, Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010: The Engine Room of the
Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Gargarella, R, Pilar Domingo, and Theunis Roux, eds. Courts
and Social Transformation in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for the Poor (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006);
César Rodriguez-Garavito & Diana Rodriguez-Franco, Radical Deprivation on Trial: The Impact of Judicial
Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in Global South (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); and Charles A.
Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1913).
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are these constitutions continuities of radical struggles,8 ‘small revolutions’9 that herald better
societies? Such questions are important in the context of our world where the search for a
paradigm that will liberate the world from forces that dominate, exploit, and oppress most global
citizens remain ongoing.

The role of constitutions and the law as an instrument of transformation; the agency for
developing transformative constitutionalism (judicial officers, the bar, the public and organic
intellectuals from various disciplines, traditional systems, and religions); as well as its politics
and ideology continues to engage debates, interrogations, and demystifications. With the
resurrection of radical Pan Africanism, the question of a progressive Pan Africanist
jurisprudence for the liberation of Africa is being discussed in the academy, Pan African
institutions, civil society and in various social movements.10 With the effort to make
transformative constitutions in Africa and the Global South advance unabated, all the elements
below anchor the quest for transformative constitutions and constitutionalism.

II
The Kenyan 2010 Transformative Constitution: Elements/Pillars of its
Transformation of Kenya
(a)

Broad Objective and Purpose11

In 2010, the Kenyan people decreed that the colonial, postcolonial, and neoliberal status quo was
unacceptable and unsustainable. In fundamentally changing their society they resolved to
reconstitute and reconfigure the Kenyan state from its former vertical, imperial, authoritarian,

8

Walter Rodney, “The African Revolution” in Urgent Tasks [Sojourner Truth Organization, Chicago] 12 (1981) 5.
On page 8 Rodney writes: “…, it is worth pointing out that a perception of links and continuity between popular
resistance over a long period of time is not something unique to an African nationalist historian. This is the approach
adopted by Vietnamese scholars, by progressive Philippine scholars, and by Cuban scholars.”
9 Samir Amin, The World We Wish to See: Revolutionary Objectives in the Twenty-First Century (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 2008) at 17.
10 Note 66: Lecture in Accra, Ghana.
11 See Yash Pal Ghai, “Constitutions and Constitutionalism: The Fate of the 2010 Constitution,” in Godwin R.
Murunga, Duncan Okello and Anders Sjörgren, eds, Kenya: The Struggle for a New Constitutional Order (London:
Zed Books, 2014), ch 6. On page 127 Yash Pal Ghai conceives the Kenyan Constitution as “a revolutionary
constitution but no revolution.” The discussion on objectives is one about the basic structure of the Constitution. In
my opinion the ingredients of the basic structure of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya are broad and all-encompassing
reflecting the great commitment by Kenyans to fundamentally restructure the status quo of their society. See infra,
note 19, the BBI decision.
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and unaccountable ogre to an accountable, horizontal, decentralized, democratized, and
responsive state.12 Under the new Constitution, the vision of nationhood is premised on a number
of core norms, which include: a sovereign state;13 national unity; political integration and
diversity; democratization and decentralization of the Executive arm; devolution of power;
popular sovereignty14 (in which the state and its public service are servants and not masters of
the people); integrity in public leadership; a Bill of Rights that provides for socio-economic
rights to reinforce the civil and political rights (thereby reinforcing the whole gamut of human
rights to radically address the status quo and signal the creation of a human rights state and
society);15 and finally, undoing the status quo in land (that has been the country’s Achilles heel)
to anchor Kenya’s economic and democratic development.

(b)
(i)

Specific Elements/Pillars
Independent and Resourced Institutions

The building of institutions is one of the great pillars of the Constitution. Indeed, strong
institutions are part of the basis for the transformation of Kenya. Such institutions are a necessity
born out of history of the imperial presidency since independence. Through constitutional
amendments since independence the imperial presidency became the center of authoritarianism.
The 2010 Constitution creates core institutions to defang the state and neuter the imperial

12

There is no doubt the 2010 Constitution seeks to reform the colonial and neocolonial state in its exercise of
political power and in its distribution of land and natural resources. Its key institutions, particularly finance and the
machinery of violence, are held accountable under the Constitution. Devolution democratizes and decentralizes the
state and its political power right to the grassroots. Such counties as Makueni that are beacons of progressive
implementation of the Constitution bear these facts out. So, if this Constitution is implemented, part of the outcome
of the political struggles is it could decolonize the state, and thereafter lay basis for a transformative state depending
on the ideological and political nature of the political leadership that is implementing it. Such leadership’s vision
would be reflected in all institutions including the Judiciary. At that stage we could envision the transformative state
developing into a revolutionary one to birth the kind of society the country would need.
13 I do not intend the two concepts, namely, sovereign state and popular sovereignty, to have a tension here. Kenya
is not a sovereign state. Nor is popular sovereignty embedded in our ideology and politics because of the elite
politics of division. I believe both concepts are aspirational as well as part of what we are struggling for as we think
freedom and emancipation. It is important, however, to bear in mind that sovereignty, like nationalism, has a class
content. If this class content is hidden, then we do not interrogate and problematize in whose interest we praise
sovereignty. In the case of Kenya, sovereignty has to historicized, interrogated and demystified within the struggles
against the imperialism of the West and East that is propped by its class alliance with the Kenyan elite/comprador
bourgeoisie. I thank Professor Okafor Obiora for raising this issue when he read the earlier drafts of this article.
14 The 2010 Constitution has many provisions that that decree the centrality or primacy of the sovereignty of the
Kenyan people. See the short discussion on this aspect below on pages 5-6
15 Willy Mutunga, “Human Rights States and Societies: A Reflection from Kenya” in Eunice N. Sahle,ed, Human
Rights in Africa: Contemporary Debates and Struggles (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) 19.
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presidency. Its norms and institutions are meant to prevent the resurrection of the executive
dictatorship. These institutions include county governments; constitutional commissions that
provide checks and balances as well as independence and principles of inter-dependence between
state organs; financial institutions that are transparent and accountable, particularly the Treasury
and state security apparatuses; and institutions set up to guarantee equitable distribution of land
and other national resources.

(ii)
History of Kenya’s Past Struggles
The 2010 Constitution also reflects the vision of those compatriots who struggled and fought
against domination, exploitation, and oppression by British colonialists. History records their
invocation of discourses of reform, revolution, human rights, social justice, patriotism, freedom,
nationhood, among others that the 2010 Constitution decrees.16

(iii)

The Sovereignty, Supremacy, and Centrality of Kenyan People

The sovereignty of the Kenyan people becomes supreme and central17 in the implementation of
the Constitution. Executive, legislative, and judicial authorities are derived from the people. The
2010 Constitution provides for national values and principles of governance. They include
patriotism, national unity, sharing and devolution of power, the rule of law, democracy and
participation of the people, human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human

16

Preamble to the 2010 Kenyan Constitution; Maina wa Kinyatti, History of Resistance in Kenya, 1884-2002 (New
York: Mau Mau Research Centre, 2008); Shiraz Durrani, Pio Gama Pinto: Kenya’s Unsung Martyr (Nairobi: Vita
Books, 2018); Shiraz Durrani, Kenya’s War of Independence: Mau Mau and Its Legacy of Resistance to Colonialism
and Imperialism, 1948-1990 (Nairobi: Vita Books, 2018); Julie MacArthur, Dedan Kimathi on Trial: Colonial
Justice and the Popular Memory in Kenya’s Mau Mau Rebellion (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017);
17 There can be no doubt in the provisions of the 2010 Constitution about the centrality and supremacy of the
Kenyan people in its implementation. See the Preamble, Articles 1, 3, 7, 10, 11, Chapter 4, Articles 22 (1) and 258
(1) (on Public Interest Litigation which is a robust constitutional expression on the participation of the people in
checking the subversion of the Constitution by the Executive, Parliament, Judiciary, all commissions and state
institutions, and the citizens themselves); Articles 22 (2) and 258 (2) decree robust sovereignty of the Kenyan people
and institutions and organizations. The citizens can be the basis of building progressive public interest jurisprudence
in the protection of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution itself; Articles 91, 94, 129, 159, Chapter 15 on
Commissions: One of their objectives is “to protect the sovereignty of the people.”; Articles 255-257 ( the people’s
sovereignty reigns supreme in matters of amending the Constitution; and Article 259 provides for the development
of a theory of interpreting the Constitution that is pro-people, decolonized, de-imperialized, de-racialized, deethnicized, gender just, patriotic, rich (robust) indigenous, transformative, and progressive. Indeed, this theory has to
be cognizant of the people’s economic, social, cultural, spiritual, and political struggles that underpin the word and
spirit of the Constitution.
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rights, non-discrimination and protection of the marginalized, popular participation in politics,
integrity, transparency and accountability, and sustainable development. The fundamental values
that ungird all these values and principles are human dignity,18 inclusiveness, equity, equality,
non-discrimination, democracy, protection of the marginalized, and participation of the people.
Our democracy and the participation of the people are both fundamental pillars of our
development. The courts have ruled on what participation of the people entails.19 This
jurisprudence of the participation of the people in development has called for robust involvement
on the basis that the people think and know of their material needs. The courts have demanded
full disclosures of critical information and knowledge on development projects. The “sweetheart
deals” of our corrupt elite are being subjected to this participation of the people. Coupled with
devolution of political power and equitable distribution of resources, the ordinary people have
begun to benefit from the results of devolved political and state power to the grassroots. This
participation of the people is also integrated in what we call below “Without the Law
Jurisprudence.”

There can be no doubt in the provisions of the 2010 Constitution about the centrality of the
Kenyan people in its implementation. It is this centrality and supremacy that provides the various
18

Horace Campbell, “Reconstruction, Transformation, and the Unification of the Peoples of Africa in the 21st
Century: Rekindling the Pan African Spirit of Kwame Nkrumah” an Inaugural Lecture, Kwame Nkrumah Chair in
African Studies, 2017, pages 1- 2 and 24. “Pan Africanism from the outset has been concerned with human dignity
and the concept of dignity has gone through many iterations from the period of enslavement, to the period of
partitioning and colonialism, the period of apartheid and neocolonialism to the current period when corporations
have given themselves the right to patent life forms. In the era of the information revolution and genetic engineering,
cyborgs, robotics, the solar revolution and artificial intelligence, the question of what or who is a human and the
dignity of the human person has been reopened. The bio-political questions that are arising in this century of bioeconomy challenge all of humanity, but more so the African and indigenous persons who have been threatened with
genocidal violence in past periods of ‘scientific’ advancements in Western ‘development’ paradigms.” pages 1-2.
19 Communication Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 Others (2015), Petition
No. 14 of 2014, eKLR (Supreme Court of Kenya at Nairobi). The landmark 5 Judge decision of the High Court of
Kenya in David Ndii & Others vs the Attorney-General and Others delivered on 13 May, 2021 goes further than the
Supreme Court in its clarity on the participation of the people as part of their sovereign will under the Constitution.
This landmark decision has been praised by renowned Indian and Kenyan constitutional law professors: Upendra
Baxi,““Hooks”, “Pillar” and “Foundations” of Constitutionalism: Basic Structure in Kenyan Jurisprudence”, India
Legal (21 May 2021), online: <https://www.indialegallive.com/column-news/hooks-pillars-and-foundations-ofconstitutionalism-basic-stature-in-kenyan-jurisprudence/>; Gautam Bhatia, “Notes From a Foreign Field: An Instant
Classic-The Kenyan High Court’s BBI Judgement”, Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy (14 May 2021),
online:< https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2021/05/14/notes-from-a-foreign-field-an-instant-classic-the-kenyanhigh-courts-bbi-judgment/>;Makau Mutua, “Kenya and the BBI Five”, VerfBlog (11 June 2021), online:
<https://verfassungsblog.de/kenya-and-the-bbi-five>; Ambreena Manji, “The BBI Judgment and the Invention of
Kenya”, VerfbBlog (22 May 2021), online: < https://verfassungsblog.de/the-bbi-judgment-and-the-invention-ofkenya/>
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entry points for robust public interest litigation (PIL) which is also known as “strategic impact
litigation”. This litigation is provided for in the Constitution under the Articles 22 and 258 of the
Constitution. It is one of the great pillars of participation of the people in the struggle for the
implementation of the Constitution and its transformation.20

(iv)
Integration of Formal African Justice Systems with the Transformed Informal
Colonial Justice System
As a pathway to a decolonized judicial system, Article 159(2) of the Constitution has restored
“traditional dispute resolution mechanisms” with constitutional limitations. Under Article 159(3)
of the Constitution traditional dispute resolution mechanisms shall not be used in a way that (a)
contravenes the Bill of Rights; (b) is repugnant to justice and morality or results to outcomes that
are repugnant to justice and morality; or (c) is inconsistent with the Constitution or any written
law. The colonial repugnancy clause finds its way back but in a decolonized constitution. Justice
and morality cannot any more refer to British injustice and immorality that was part of our
colonial history.

The fact is, we live in a country where courts are not the only forums for the administration of
justice. Indeed, only 5% of Kenyans have access to the formal courts. The other 95% access
other forums for the administration of justice. Access to justice must encompass both formal and
informal justice systems. Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms keep these institutions as
free as possible from lawyers, “their law” and the “law system of the capital.”21 The
development of the “Without the law” jurisprudence is a critical nugget in our jurisprudence.

20

See Marion Muringe Ogeto & Waikwa Wanyoike, “Judiciary and Public Interest Litigation in Protecting the
Right of Assembly in Kenya”, in Policing Protests in Kenya (Nairobi: Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies,
2019) 55. PIL has its challenges and limitations: insufficient funding for the many tasks that have to be undertaken
because of the forces bent on subverting the constitution; Bar association not doing much; lack of clarity in the role
of amici curiae and interested parties; weak solidarities between PIL organizations and social movements and the
citizens generally; few citizens taking up PIL on their own; PIL being used by national and foreign interests in their
economic disputes; dearth of public intellectuals in PIL; and above failure by the state, its institutions, and the ruling
class to commit to a culture of obeying court orders, a subversion of the Constitution and the rule of law.
21
Harry William Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in the Nineteenth-Century
England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), at 10. Several passages found between page 1-12 and page
188-214 are extremely useful in the development of the “Without the law” Jurisprudence.
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“Without the law” jurisprudence should become the people’s jurisprudence capturing their
sovereignty as well as signaling the devolution of political and state power to the grassroots.

It is critical to observe that since traditional dispute resolution mechanisms will be conducted in
the various national languages of the various communities in Kenya, the collective outcomes of
such ventures can only enrich our progressive jurisprudence, breathe life into the implementation
of the Constitution as well as strengthen our diversity and democracy. This linguistic approach to
traditional dispute resolution will also help in the translations that have to be undertaken of the
Constitution. The approach will thereby enrich the languages of the community through new
vocabulary that is borrowed from around the globe that will be reflected in the Constitution. I
believe our other national language, Kiswahili, will be enriched making it a worthwhile project
to translate the Constitution from its Kiswahili version to the national languages. These
experiences and outcomes, it is suggested, will have their comparative niche in the world.

As we seek the integration of formal judicial systems inherited from colonialism with traditional
justice systems, the overriding objective should be access to justice to all. We must, therefore,
envisage an African Judiciary out of this integration. Such imagination will entail an African
Law School, its curriculum and faculty (what role will the traditional lawyers and judges play in
the creation of the African Judiciary) to reinforce the development of the jurisprudence
envisaged here. Such approach will extend the trajectories of pro-people jurisprudence that will
build the people’s confidence in the Judiciary.
Wa Thiong’o emphasizes the importance of African languages when he observes that “We want
African languages to become bridgeheads to continental African unity and Pan-African unity.”22
To recall our colonial and imperialistic past Wa Thiong’o states that, “…it hath ever been the use
of the conqueror to despise the language of the conquered and to force [her] him by all means to
learn [hers] his.”23 The language of the conqueror becomes the language of power which the
majority do not have access to. It becomes a marker of both inclusion and exclusion. In the case

22

Ngugi wa Thiong’o, “The Language of Justice in Africa” (Speech delievered in Lusaka, Zambia, 13 September
2013), p 13.
23 Ibid at p 7.
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of Kenya, the Constitution is not accessible to majority of Kenyan people because it is in English
and Kiswahili. Having the Constitution in the national languages is critical in enriching our
jurisprudence. I have found in our cultures values that trump the so-called modern values.24 The
participation of the people in all the affairs of their society will also require the development of
African languages.

(v)

Integration of International and Regional Law as part of the Law of Kenya under
the 2010 Constitution

The Constitution took a bold step and provided that “[t]he general rules of international law shall form
part of the law of Kenya” and “[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of
Kenya under this Constitution.” 25 In the context of international law, in our quest to be developers and
shapers of international law, we have robustly relied on the TWAIL (Third World Approaches to
International Law) movement. Some Kenyan scholars in the diaspora are prominent members of this
movement.26 There are distinguished third world scholars in this movement as well.27 Mutua writing on
“What is TWAIL?” states:

The regime of international law is illegitimate. It is a predatory system that
legitimizes, reproduces, and sustains the plunder and subordination of the Third
World by the West. Neither universality nor its promise of global order and
stability make international law a just, equitable, and legitimate code of global
governance for the Third World. The construction and universalization of
international law were essential to the imperial expansion that subordinated nonEuropean peoples and societies to European conquest and domination.
Historically, the Third World has generally viewed international law as a regime
and discourse of domination, not resistance and liberation. This broad dialectic of

24

For example, our inherited judicial culture reflected in the structures of courts, judicial address and dress are
trumped by the traditional judicial cultures in all three aspects. In the Judiciary Transformation Framework 20122016 judicial Cultural Revolution was undertaken to spearhead our struggle against colonial judicial culture. See
also Willy Mutunga, “Dressing and Addressing the Judiciary: Reflections on the History and Politics of Judicial
Attire and Dress” (2014) 20 Buffalo Human Rights L Rev 125 and republished in Eunice N Sahle, ed, Democracy,
Constitutionalism, and Politics in Africa: Historical Contexts, Developments and Dilemmas (New York:
Palgrave/Macmillan, 2017), 131-166; See also John S Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (Nairobi: East
African Educational Publishers, 2011) at 1-5. Religion and worship as used in the constitutional provisions include
traditional African religions that have also constitutional enforcement under Article 159 (2) (c).
25
Article 2(5) and (6) of the Constitution.
26
Professors Makau Mutua, James Gathii, and Joel Ngugi. Professor Obiora Chinedu Okafor from Nigeria is also
one of these eminent public international law intellectuals who do TWAIL.
27
See James Thuo Gathii, “TWAIL: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative
Bibliography” (2011) 3:1 Trade L & Development 26.
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opposition to international law is defined and referred to here as Third World
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL).28
Mutua argues that “TWAIL is both a political and an intellectual movement”29 whose members
are “united in their broad opposition to the unjust global order.”30 TWAIL seeks to both
deconstruct and reconstruct international law as a tool and device for the liberation of the
discipline and discourse from the imperialism of the West and East. TWAIL does not end at the
point of protest. It seeks a better tomorrow not just for the Global South but the Global North.
TWAIL scholars are, therefore, not just protest scholars. They are part of political movement to
resist the imperialism of the West and East. The demystification, deconstruction, decolonization,
and de-imperialization of international law is an important ingredient in the development of PanAfrican jurisprudence for the liberation of Kenya, Africa, the Global North and South. This need
for the Third World Interpretation of international law is extremely important in the context of
the current struggles over intellectual property rights and the rules that are being fashioned in the
digital era in the context of the World Trade Organization.31

(vi)

New Judiciary32 and Transformative judicial politics under the 2010 Constitution

Upendra Baxi (a distinguished Indian radical scholar who is also a progressive organic intellectual) argues
that all judges are active but not all judges are activist.33 He makes the following distinction:

An active judge regards herself, as it were, a trustee of state regime power and
authority. Accordingly she usually defers to the executive and legislature; shuns
appearance of policy making; supports patriarchy and other forms of violent
28

American Society of International Law, “What is TWAIL?” (The American Society of International Law
Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 5-8 April 2000) at p 31. “It is therefore important to
realize that today’s Third World scholars and political actors stand on the shoulders of Bandung and the Group of
77, among other important milestones of the Third World challenge to European hegemony”, at page 32.
29
Ibid
30 Ibid
31 Yash Tandon, Trade is War: The West’s War Against the World (London: OR Books, 2015).
32 The New Judiciary under the Constitution comprises: 1) new judicial officers recruited after the promulgation of
the Constitution on 27 August where the process of recruitment outlaws the colonial and postcolonial ones before
the promulgation; 2) judicial officers serving when the Constitution was promulgated are subjected to rigorous
vetting as to their suitability to serve in the New Judiciary. The vetting was done by Judges and Magistrates Vetting
Board that had a comprehensive criteria on suitability including integrity, competence, temperance, judicial laziness
among others.
33
Upendra Baxi, “The Avatars of Indian Judicial Activism: Exploration in the Geographies of [In] Justice,” in S K
Vermaand Kusum Kumar, eds, Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of India: Its Grasp and Reach (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2000) 156.

30
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/thr/vol8/iss1/2

10

Mutunga: Transformative Constitutions and Constitutionalism : A New Theory

exclusion; and overall ‘stability’ over ‘change.’ In contrast an activist judge
regards herself as holding judicial power in fiduciary capacity for civil and
democratic rights of all peoples, especially disadvantaged, dispossessed, and
deprived. She does not regard adjudicatory power as repository of the reason of
state; she constantly reworks the distinction between the legal and political
sovereign, in ways that legitimate judicial action as an articulator of the popular
sovereign. This opposition implies at least one irreducible characteristic of activist
adjudication: namely, that a judge remains possessed of inherent powers to mould
the greater good of the society as a whole.34
This, indeed, is a context of demystifying decisional independence of judicial officers as well the
institutional independence of Judiciary as a whole. I believe that active judges in Baxi’s
categorization are also activist for the status quo while the activist judges in his categorization
are very active against the status quo. Given societal responsibilities that Baxi correctly imposes
on them, they surely must work very hard by refusing to be legal centric in their approaches.
These are contradictory processes because society is comprised of conflicting interests. There
are, therefore, political struggles in the Judiciary itself based on each judicial officer’s
intellectual, ideological, political, social, and cultural position. Judicial officers should stop
deluding themselves that they are not doing politics. Whether their politics emerges from their
judgments or their extra-judicial scholarly writings and speeches, judicial officers have
consigned the Judiciary to what Baxi calls “an institutional political actor.”35

Baxi writes:

I believe it is time to take stock and say what judges regard as unsayable: that the
Supreme Court [of India] is a centre of political power. I believe that the
recognition of this fact, howsoever belated, is worthwhile as it would be
conducive to the clarification of the political role of the Court. And such a
recognition will impel us to ask more relevant questions as to what kind of
political role the Court ought to play in a changing India.36

34

Ibid at 166. Is the term “activism” really the appropriate one for the kinds of liberatory concerns we are engaging
here? In our quest to change colonial judicial culture pertaining to dress and address we talked of Cultural
Revolution. We knew it was not that but a form of judicial activism necessary in a trajectory of transformation that
could be a basis of fundamental revolutionary change going forward. We were also aware of the limitations of this
jurisprudence given the lack of progressive political leadership in the country. This analysis also signals class
struggles within the Judiciary itself in quest for either progressive or regressive implementation of transformative
constitutions. The judicial class struggles are part of the class struggles in the Kenyan society itself.
35
Upendra Baxi, “Demosprudence versus Jurisprudence: The Indian Judicial Experience in the Context of
Comparative Constitutional Studies” (2014) 14 Macquarie L J 3 at 10.
36 Upendra Baxi, The Indian Supreme Court and Politics (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 1980), at 5.
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In his book, Onyango-Oloka37 quotes Bagwati CJ of the Supreme Court of India as saying that the
“Indian Constitution is a document of social revolution…[t]he Judiciary has therefore a socio-economic
destination and a creative function.”38 Within the title of Oloka-Onyango’s book, When Courts Do

Politics: Public Interest Law and Litigation in East Africa,39 are two express questions, namely,
“Do courts do politics?” and “when do they do politics?” He answers these questions in the
affirmative as seen in the title of the sixth chapter of his book: “At the Pinnacle of Politics:
Deciding a Presidential Election.”40 I agree with him. Courts do politics and do politics all the
time.

In election petitions, including the presidential election petition cases, judiciaries and judicial
officers come face to face with the politics of the elites and their political successions. In the case
of Kenya, the two decisions on the two presidential election petitions in 201741 resulted in the
Supreme Court being attacked brutally by the two factions of the elite political parties. These
attacks have not abated. One thing is very clear though. By deciding against both elite factions in
both petitions the Supreme Court, in my view, signaled its independence. It also made a clear
statement that it will uphold the Constitution without regard to the pressures the factions will
impose on it.

How the Supreme Court sustains this position will be critical to the development of
jurisprudence, its independence, the independence of the entire judiciary, and judicial politics
going forward. As the apex court, the Supreme Court will have to give leadership on judicial
politics so that the Judiciary ceases, once and for all, to be perceived as an appendage of the two
arms of government, particularly the executive. The Supreme Court will also have to give
leadership against all the pressures and influences that can compromise the institutional and
37

Infra. Note 39
Ibid at p. 94
39 Oloka-Onyango’s book, When Courts Do Politics: Public Interest Law and Litigation in East Africa (Cambridge
Scholars Publishing, 2017
40 Ibid at 216
41 Raila Amolo Odinga & Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 Others (2017),
Presidential Petition 1 of 2017, eKLR (Supreme Court of Kenya at Nairobi); and John Harun Mwau & 2 Others v
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 Others (2017), Petitions 2 & 4 Consolidated, eKLR
(Supreme Court of Kenya at Nairobi); See also, “Will the Kenya Elite ever Grow Up?”, The Star (15 September
2017), online: https://www.the-star-co-ke/news/2017/09/15/mutunga-opens-up-on-supreme-court-rulings-in2017_1636257
38
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decisional independence of the Judiciary and its judicial officers. Indeed, the Kenyan judiciary is
at a crossroads. It either accepts its historical trajectory of a captured institution by the pressures
and influences or becomes the major voice of the vision of the Constitution and the aspirations of
the Kenyan people reflected in that vision.

In the case of Kenya, my view has been that the Constitution is activist and I believe our judges
and other judicial officers are all expected to be activist in their quest to implement an activist
Constitution. Indeed, the Constitution’s political vision is not wholly liberal but has some radical
ingredients of social democracy and socialism as the ingredients of its objective and purpose.
The Kenyan Constitution has a vision for the institutional independence of the Judiciary and the
decisional independence of judicial officers. This vision is found in the provisions on
qualifications for appointment, the recruitment process, the chapter on integrity and leadership,
and the constitutional decree that judicial power is derived from the people. Judicial
independence is for all people.

Judicial officers should constantly and consistently ask themselves in whose interests the
independence of judiciary is for. They should also accept they have differing visions of this
independence on the basis of their differing intellectual, ideological, political, social, and cultural
positions. This is the essence of Baxi’s contribution to this issue. As such, independence of the
judiciary is a contested terrain among the judicial officers that gives rise to its own political
struggles. This also means that after judicial officers’ struggle against the various pressures
inimical to their independence (executive, parliament, corporate, civil society, cartels, ethnic
communities, religion, region, family, relatives, and friends)42 to achieve their individual
independence, a further struggle ensues that is addressed to the question: “in whose interest this
independence is exercised?”

42

All judicial officers are constantly reminded of their roots and are accountable to people of their roots and their
compatriots. Of course, they have a choice not to reflect this accountability in their jurisprudence and in their
politics. My experience as a judge clearly shows these pressures weighing heavily on any judge. I do not think there
is a judicial officer who is immune from these pressures. A Pan-African judicial officer will face regional,
continental and global pressures in an equal measure.
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I believe the political cause that we are calling upon the Judiciaries to perform goes beyond
judicial activism and encompasses political activism itself. I have addressed this issue in a
Lecture I gave to the Law Society of Malawi.43 I expressed the view that if the ruling elites in
Africa, political parties, the bureaucratic elite, the military, the church and even international
capital have had their say in decisively but ruinously shaping Africa’s governance and
development trajectory in the years past, it would appear that the natural evolution of Africa’s
constitutional and political order has created this historical moment for the Judiciary to have its
turn and say in determining Africa’s democratic path. It is an opportunity for the Judiciary,
acting as an agent for societal transformation, to fortify Africa’s democracy, rule of law and
accountability, and, to markedly improve on the governance record of other state institutions and
actors that have, sometimes unconstitutionally, intervened in electoral processes. The Judiciary
has a historic obligation to acquit itself well and earn public respect as the last frontier or
custodian of Africa’s democratic development. It is the Judiciary’s tryst with Africa’s democratic
and developmental destiny.

The Judiciary, then, is the last frontier between a united, democratic, and peaceful Africa and a violent,
unstable, conflict-wracked Africa. If the judiciary fails, then very ripe conditions for conflict, military
coups, and hegemonic international interventions that may even acquire a regional character - and which
may lead ineluctably and inexorably to the dismemberment of African states – may be created. That is
why the Judiciary and judges need to take their work seriously, recognize that they are institutional
political actors with a capacity to put Africa on the right path.44 Hence the words of Nyerere on the role of
judges in preserving democracy, are quite apt:

Unless judges perform their work properly, none of the objectives of a democratic society
can be met45.

43

Willy Mutunga, “Africa’s Electoral Condition: The Judiciary as an Institutional and Political Actor for
Democracies in Transition” (Keynote address delivered at the Malawi Law Society Annual Conference, Nkopola,
Mangochi, Malawi, 23 February 2019). Also carried by The Africanists, 18 March 2019, online:
https://theafricanists.info.
44
It is in the public domain that one of the former Presidents of the Constitutional Court of Colombia ran for the
Presidency of Colombia and was second in the election. It is believed that in part the confidence the Colombians had
in the Constitutional Court and its pro-people jurisprudence could have helped. I believe this precedent should
repeated in other countries. Judges have ideological and political positions, can build and nurture progressive
political parties and play robust roles in the search for alternative political leaderships in Global South.
45 Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism (Dares Salaam, Nairobi, London, New York: Oxford University
Press,1968) 110.
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The Judiciary and the Bar are judicial twins joined at the hip. The independence of the bar is as
important as the independence of the Judiciary. The role I have given the Judiciary is premised
on a bar that shuns politics of division in favor of politics of democracy and humanity. The bar
must help in the development of jurisprudence and democracy that is envisioned here. The
Judiciary, the bar, and public intellectuals in all disciplines in the academy are collectively the
crucible for progressive Pan African Jurisprudence that can liberate Africa.46 But the Bar needs
to be professional and guide their clients properly.

(vii)

The New Judiciary: Independence of the Judiciary and Judicial Integrity

Independence of the Judiciary is a fundamental pillar of judicial integrity. Let me give you the
modern traditional definition of the principle. Judicial independence has been at the core of the
world’s democratic and constitutional evolution. The principles of ‘separation of powers’ and
‘checks and balances’ principles that govern inter-branch relations within the state, and of which
judicial independence is a conceptual derivative, have been the holy grail of modern liberal
nation state for centuries now. Lee and Campbell47 define judicial independence as the principle
that focuses on the creation of an environment in which the Judiciary can perform its judicial
function as one of the three branches of government without being subject to any form of duress,
pressure or influence from any person or other institutions, in particular the other branches of
government.

Modern transformative constitutions go deeper than this traditional liberal definition by
demystifying the duress, pressure or influence. Modern transformative constitutions do this by
providing the requisite qualifications for judicial officers, and the process of their recruitment.
Robust public participation has become a key requirement in the recruitment of judges. In the
case of Kenya all judicial officers are appointed by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). In
the cases of the recruitment and appointment of the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice, the

46

Willy Mutunga, “PanAfrican Jurisprudence for the Liberation of Africa” (Lecture delivered at the Institute of
African Studies, University of Ghana, Accra, 27 June 2018) [The Lecture is on the Website of the Institute.]
47

H P Lee and Enid Campbell, The Australian Judiciary, 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 7.
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JSC sends to the President the name of the candidate for each position for vetting by Parliament.
In the JSC the Executive is represented by the Attorney General and the Head of the Public
Service Commission. Under the Constitution the President appoints two other commissioners (a
woman and a man) who are vetted by Parliament.

In theory, the two commissioners are supposed to represent the public, not the Presidency. The
practice has invariably shown that the two internalize their appointment as representatives of the
President. Whatever other views the President may have on the recruitment of judicial officers,
the President sends them to the JSC for consideration, including the JSC giving the affected
candidates due process to respond to such views. The President under the Constitution does not,
therefore, appoint judges, but participates in the process of their recruitment. It is the JSC that
ultimately appoints, and the President has no choice but to swear them into office.48 For judges

48

A five-judge bench of the High Court in Law Society of Kenya v Attorney General & 2 others [2016] eKLR; See
also Petition 36 of 2019, Adrian Kamotho Njenga v Hon the Attorney General and 3 interested parties. The three
interested parties were the Judicial Service Commission, the Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court,
and the Law Society of Kenya. This 3 judge bench of the High Court followed the decision of five-judge Bench of
the High Court including an impressive array of foreign decisions in support of its decision.
The question has now arisen about what is to be done if the President refuses to swear in judges recruited by the
JSC. See Law Society of Kenya v Attorney General and 3 others (2019), Petition No. E327 of 2020, eKLR in which
the President had refused to appoint and gazette the election of Judge Mohammed Warsame as the JSC
representative for the Court of Appeal. Among the orders given by Judge Chacha Mwita was order iii: “A
declaration is hereby issued that the 1st interested party [Judge Warsame], having been duly elected Commissioner
of the Judicial Service Commission as required by the constitution and law, and the President having failed to
appoint him in violation of mandatory timelines set by section 15(2)(b) of the Judicial Service Act, the 1st interested
party be and is hereby deemed to have been appointed and is at liberty to take his position as a Commissioner of the
Judicial Service Commission, representing Judges of the Court of Appeal.” I do not think “appointment” includes
swearing in as a duty or authority of the President. That is merely traditional. Swearing is a requirement of Article
74 of the Constitution which merely provides that all state officers must subscribe to the oath of office in the Third
Schedule. This Article does not say it should be before the President. Article 141 provides that the President must be
sworn in before the Chief Justice. Article 148 (4) says the Deputy President must be sworn in before the Chief
Justice. Article 152 (4) (a) provides that the Cabinet Secretaries must be sworn in before the President. The
Speakers of Parliament swear in members of the respective houses. For all other state officers the Constitution is
silent. The Chief Justice swears in other state officers besides the President and the Deputy President. Neither the
Constitution nor the Judicial Service Act provides for who swears in the Chief Justice. The tradition and practice is
the President does. These practices as part of the transition between the two Constitutions are rescued by Section 3
of the Supreme Court Act in line with the vision of the 2010 Constitution. While the route of contempt of court by
the President is not open under the Constitution (because of its criminal sanctions) and the unlikelihood of any
Member of Parliament bringing an impeachment motion, is the only route not the one-off extending Judge Mwita’s
decision to this particular disobedience by the President? Such orders can be sought including an order that the Chief
Justice swears in the Judges and allocates duties to them. An order could be also made that they be paid from the
Consolidated Fund. This cause of action would be in line with the supremacy of the will of the people and a
confirmation that the Judiciary will enforce its orders under the Constitution. The struggle that will ensue between
the two arms of government will then be taken to the courts of public opinion as the only site of that struggle. I do
not see the Executive winning such a struggle.
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of the Court of Appeal, the High Court, and judicial officers of the courts below the superior
courts, the JSC recruits them. The President swears in the judges of superior courts while the
Chief Justice swears in the magistrates and Kadhis who head the other subordinate courts.

The Kenya Constitution also provides for financial independence of the Judiciary from both the
Executive and Parliament.49 The Judiciary Fund is created under the Constitution. Parliament has
come up with a draft legislation to implement this constitutional provision. It also has a draft
legislation on the retirement benefits of judges. The retirement benefits of the Chief Justice and
the Deputy Chief Justice are covered by a statute that is operational.50 Financial independence of
the Judiciary is critical given its colonial and postcolonial history. Until the 2010 Constitution,
the Judiciary was in reality and perception an appendage of the Executive. Giving it financial
independence from the other two arms under the Constitution therefore signaled the crucial
policy often forgotten that the resources of the country do not belong to the Executive and
Parliament. Indeed, the Constitution has provisions that hold these two arms, and the Judiciary,
to account for the resources they hold in trust for the Kenyan people.
The disciplining of judicial officers 51 while observing the principle of the security of tenure, is
the task of an independent JSC. Apart from the members of the JSC already noted above the JSC
is chaired by the Chief Justice. The Judges of the Supreme Court elect their representative to the
JSC. The Court of Appeal also elects their representative to the JSC. A judge of the High Court
and a Magistrate (both man and woman respectively) are elected by the Kenya Magistrates and
Judges Association to sit in the JSC. The Law Society of Kenya elects a woman and a man to

49

Indeed, the values of equity and equality in Article 10 of the Constitution and the centrality of the will of the
people in the Constitution end the colonial and neocolonial myth that both the Executive and Parliament own the
national resources and can distribute them at their respective whims. The people own the resources and their
equitable distribution. Nowhere in the Constitution have the Kenyan people given the Executive and Parliament to
starve the Judiciary and other institutions of the resources of the people. One hopes, going forward, that the
Judiciary will develop a progressive jurisprudence on national resources, including land, particularly land that has
not become a commodity (community land).
50 The Retirement Benefits (Deputy President and Designated Offices) Act 2015, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 88
(Acts no.8).
51 Article 168 of the Constitution states that a judge of a superior court may be removed from office only on the
grounds of inability to perform the functions of the office arising from mental or physical incapacity; a breach of
conduct prescribed for judges of the superior courts by an Act of Parliament; bankruptcy; incompetence or gross
misconduct or misbehaviour. Magistrates face disciplinary action on these aspects as well.
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represent it in the JSC. Such a broad representation at the JSC is meant to guarantee its
independence, accountability, transparence, and fairness in its work.

Cardinal to the independence of the Judiciary is the integrity of the judicial officers themselves.
No judicial officer or staff should ever think of soliciting and or accepting a bribe. The JSC seeks
the participation of the public in their decisions on the suitability of individuals who apply for
those positions. The JSC also seeks integrity reports from the Law Society of Kenya, the Kenya
Revenue Authority, the Director of Criminal Investigations, the Universities (to confirm the
candidates have paid their university loans), the corporate sector (if the candidates have worked
in the sector), and National Intelligence Service. The JSC has a limited but growing capacity to
conduct its own integrity inquiries. We found at the JSC, when I served as Chief Justice, that it
was dangerous to rely on unchallenged reports from the departments of the state without
verifying them. In cases where these integrity reports were negative about the integrity of a
candidate, we always gave the candidate a chance to respond to the reports. In the case of serving
judicial officers who sought promotion, we always perused their personal files in our custody to
find out if they ever had integrity issues.

There are other pressures, duress, and influences that are invariably ignored in assessing the
independence of the judiciary. These are insidious and invisible influences outside the traditional
ones from the other arms of government. These include the seduction of political and judicial
power; families and friends; vested corporate and civil society interests; and the international
community – a euphemism for economic, social, cultural, and political foreign interests. For
judicial officers and staff, independence of the judiciary is a cause they should be ready to die
for. It is their expression of patriotism and alternative politics for the Motherland.

I believe that the independence of the Judiciary, and the decisional independence of the
individual judicial officers is about the integrity of the judicial officers. I believe the fundamental
pillar for this integrity is the ideological and political positions of judicial officers. Building
people’s confidence in the Judiciary and the judicial officers depends on the integrity of the
institution and its judicial officers and staff. A judicial officer or staff will be seen and perceived
to be a woman or man of integrity if the authors of the pressures, duress, and influence narrated
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herein, know that the judicial officer or staff cannot be manipulated or compromised in their
respective integrity. These forces should also know that the judicial officer or staff cannot be
manipulated or compromised in their respective integrity by the enemies of those forces.
Whatever decision she or he makes, therefore, will be critiqued or supported based on real and
perceived honesty of the judicial officer or staff. Where judicial decisions are invariably seen and
judged through various divisive lens of our people, clearly the integrity of the judicial officer is
of monumental judicial and political importance. It gives judicial officers a great moral authority
to speak to societal issues that impact transformation.52

(viii)

The New Jurisprudence Under the 2010 Constitution

This categorization of the development of Kenya’s robust (rich),53 decolonized,54 de-imperialized,55 deracialized,56 de-ethnicized,57 gender just,58patriotic,59 progressive,60 indigenous,61 pro-people,62 and
transformative63 jurisprudence is derived from the interpretation of specific provisions, the entirety of the
2010 Constitution,64 and the provisions of the Supreme Court Act, 2011.65

52

See the experience of the Kenyan Judiciary in Willy Mutunga, “Eradicating Corruption in Judiciaries under
Transformative Constitutions: Reflections from Kenya,” (Lecture delivered to International Anti-Corruption
Academy (IACA), Vienna, Austria, 4 July 2019).
53
See Section 3 of the Supreme Court Act, 2011.
54
See Article 20 of the Constitution.
55
From the discussion on integration of international and regional laws.
56
See Article 27 of the Constitution.
57
See Articles 27 and 91 of the Constitution.
58
See Article 27 of the Constitution.
59
Article 10 of the Constitution.
60
Articulated in the element of the theory of interpreting the 2010 Constitution, below pages 19-21
61
Supra note 53.
62
This categorization is based on the sovereignty, supremacy, and centrality of the Kenyan people under the
Constitution which is discussed herein. The relevant articles have been given in Supra note 17 See Lin Chun’s
article “Mass Line” in Christian Sorace, Ivan Francheschini and Nicholas Lobere, eds, Afterlives of Chinese
Communism (Acton, Australia: ANU Press & Verso, 2019) at 121. While states, parties, and ruling groups constitute
themselves into the people and not their representatives, there is in this article great analysis on how real
participation of the people can be achieved in the sharing of political power. Makueni county in Kenya has robustly
experimented our own “mass line.” There’s in practice a democratic integration of bottom-top and top-bottom in the
participation of the people.
63
The entire tenor, purpose, and vision of the Constitution in transforming its security, economy, land, equitable
distribution of resources, leadership and integrity, a modern Bill of Rights, decentralizing and democratizing the
imperial executive, creating checks and balances, building strong institutions, and the provision of national values
and principles that can impact state and nation building.
64
The Preamble and Articles 1, 2(5) and (6), 10, 20 (3) (a) and (b), 20(4), 159(2), 258, 259, particularly sub-Articles
1, 2 and 3 all anchored under the supremacy and centrality of the Kenyan people in the Constitution. See op.cit.
Note 17 for this supremacy and centrality.
65
Supra note 53.
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The development of jurisprudence under transformative constitutions tests the commitment of
judges and other judicial officers to the supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law, and the
respective loyalty to their Oaths of Office. This commitment and loyalty is the transformative
politics of a transformative constitution. My writings,66 my dissenting and concurring decisions 67
as well as my contribution while on the bench reflect the development of this jurisprudence.

(ix)
The 2010 Constitution sets out its own theory of interpretation
The Kenyan 2010 Constitution is unusual in setting out a theory of its interpretation.68 What is
this theory? I believe it is a theory that shuns staunch positivism and thus is not legal-centric. It
accepts judges make law. By invoking non-legal phenomena in its interpretation, it decrees the
“judiciary as an institutional political actor.”69 It is a theory that is a merger of paradigms and

66

Willy Mutunga, “The 2010 Constitution of Kenya and Its Interpretation: Reflections from the Supreme Court
Decisions” (2015) 1:6 Southern African Legal Information Institute, online: <
http://www.safii.org/za/journals/SPECJU/2015/6.pdf>; “Pan-African Jurisprudence for the Liberation of Africa”
(Lecture delivered at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, , Legon, Accra, 27 June 2018); Willy
Mutunga, “Human Rights States and Societies: A Reflection from Kenya” (2015) 2:1 The Transnational Human
Rights Rev 63. See also, supra note 7; Willy Mutunga, “Africa’s Electoral Condition: The Judiciary as an
Institutional and Political Actor for Democracies in Transition” (Keynote address delivered at the Malawi Law
Society Annual Conference, Nkopola, Mangochi, Malawi, 23 February 2019); “Kenya’s Constitution 2010: A
Reflection of its History and Implications for the Future” (Public Lecture delivered at Kabarak University, Nakuru
County, Kenya, 21 November 2018); “The Many Accents of Law, Language, and Justice” (the 4th Neville
Alexander Lecture, Nairobi, 23 August 2018); “Politics, the Media and Independence of the Judiciary: A Personal
Footnote” (Lecture delivered at the 4th Annual ACME on Politics and the Media, Kampala, Uganda, 8 November
2017); “Developing Progressive African Jurisprudence: Reflections from Kenya’s 2010 Transformative
Constitution” (Delivered at the 2017 Lameck Goma Annual Lecture, Lusaka, Zambia, 27 July 2017); “Devolution:
The Politics and Jurisprudence of Equitable Distribution of National Resources”, (Lecture delivered at the British
Institute of East Africa, Nairobi,18 February 2017); “Transforming Judiciaries in the Global South” (Keynote
Address delivered at the Annual General Conference of the Nigerian Bar Association, International Conference
Centre, Africa Hall, Abuja, 23 August 2015); Willy Mutunga, “The 2010 Constitution of Kenya. Its Vision of a
New Bench-Bar Relationship” in Yash Pal Ghai & Jill Cottrell Ghai, eds, The Legal Profession and the New
Constitutional Order in Kenya (Nairobi: Strathmore University Press, 2014) 59; Willy Mutunga, “Dressing and
Addressing the Judiciary: Reflecting on the History and Politics of Judicial Attire and Address”(2014) 20:1 Buffalo
Human Rights L Rev 102; Republished in Eunice N, Sahle, ed, Democracy, Constitutionalism, and Politics in
Africa: Historical Contexts, Developments and Dilemmas (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2017), 131-166.
67

Re the Speaker of the Senate & Another v Attorney General & 4 Others (2013), Advisory Opinion No 2 of 2013,
eKLR (Supreme Court) at paras 155-157; and other cases discussed in articles referred to ibid;
68

Willy Mutunga, “The 2010 Constitution of Kenya and its Interpretation: Reflections from the Supreme Court
Decisions” (2015), 29:1 Speculum Juris 1.
69 Baxi , supra note 35 at 10.

30
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/thr/vol8/iss1/2

20

Mutunga: Transformative Constitutions and Constitutionalism : A New Theory

that problematizes, interrogates, historicizes all paradigms in building a radical democratic
content that is transformative of state and society. It is a theory that values and understands both
multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches 70 to the implementation of the Constitution.
This theory is neither insular nor inward looking and seeks its place in global comparative
jurisprudence; and seeks equality of participation, development, and influence. It seeks to
reinforce those strengths in foreign jurisprudence that fit Kenyan needs (the criterion for
determining those needs is based on the discussion of values, vision, objectives, purposes, and
Bill of Rights). It denies resort by judicial officers to the common law canons of interpreting
statutes and constitutions that allow judicial officers, in so doing, to routinely reflect their
intellectual, ideological, and political biases.71 In the same vein the Kenya Parliament, in
enacting the Supreme Court Act, 2011 has in the provisions of section 3 reinforced this aspect of
the constitutional pre-occupation in its theory of interpretation. That section urges judicial
officers to take account of non-legal phenomena (such as Kenya’s historical,72 social, economic,
cultural, religious, theological, philosophical, technological, and political contexts) in
interpreting the constitution.

There is no doubt that this theory of the interpretation of the Constitution reflects judicial politics
as is anchored on the centrality and supremacy of the Kenyan people in the transformation of
their country. The Judiciary, therefore, finds itself daily at a crossroads: Does it support the status

70

See Karim Hirji, Under-Education in Africa: From Colonialism to Neoliberalism (Daraja Press, 2019), at 155.
The US Supreme Court is perhaps the best example of this. Such tools or approaches of interpretation as
originalism or original intent; modernism/Instrumentalism; literalism-historical; literalism-contemporary; and
democratic/normative or representative reinforcement have given rise to such categorizations as conservative,
liberal, and radical approaches. Judicial officers have had their biases so categorized.
72 To give an example of what is expected of the Judiciary is to track down the historical roots of the doctrine of
freedom of contract, its mitigation by the doctrine of fundamental breach through the judicial activism of
conservative British judges like Lord Denning. These judges clearly saw the economic, social, and political
consequences of glorifying the unmitigated doctrine freedom of contract. See Willy Mutunga, “Commercial Law
and Development in Kenya” (1980) 8 Int’l J of the Sociology of L 1. The period of mitigation coupled with the
decolonization of our jurisprudence will have to consider the so-called fourth or digital revolution (surveillance
capitalism and AI) which has clawed back to attributes of the doctrine of freedom of contract to its industrial
revolution’s roots! Standard form contracts are the hallmark of neoliberalism and agreeing to terms of many apps
online cannot be a negotiated contract. Collective bargaining is dead in Kenya, and I believe elsewhere around the
globe. Collective bargaining was a great mitigation of the doctrine of freedom of contract on behalf of organized
workers. Under AI and other forms of robotic capitalism the doctrine of freedom of contract will reign supreme.
This doctrine has been fundamental in the development of capitalist relations since the industrial revolution. History
records resistance against it by courts, unions, and states. We need to think through our resistance to robotic
capitalism.
71
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quo that the Constitution seeks to transform or the will of the people that is the vision of the
Constitution? This is how the Judiciary in its role as an institutional political actor is caught up in
the class struggles within itself and within the Kenyan society broadly.73

(x)

The contested paradigmatic terrain under the 2010 Constitution

Karl Marx’s Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy teaches us as
follows: “The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of
society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure…The mode of
production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in
general.”74 Engels wrote that:
[t]he economic situation is the basis, but various elements of the
superstructure…political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit:
constitutions established by the victorious class after successful battle etc juridical
forms, and even reflexes of all actual struggle in the brains of the participants,
political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further
development into systems of dogmas…also exercise their influence upon the
cause of historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their
form. There is an interaction of all these elements…75
Engels intervention is authority for two facts: that Constitutions and Law have a class content;
and that the superstructure does not merely conform to the economic base passively.76 This must
be borne in mind in so far as this analysis did not grasp the importance of race and racism in the
superstructure of capitalism. As C.L.R James had noted, “[t]he race question is subsidiary to the
73

The two blueprints on the transformation of the Judiciary (Judiciary Transformation Framework, 2012-2016 and
Sustaining Judiciary Transformation, 2017-2021) have reflected the class struggles between the conservative judicial
elite and progressive judicial elite, the latter reinforced by judicial staff. Equitable distribution of resources in the
Judiciary has been critical as the conservative judicial elite before the 2010 Constitution controlled over 60% of the
resources (pertaining to loans for housing, cars; insurance; per diems; travel; inequitable salary disparities; and
training) and foresaw judicial politics that was anti-people and for the ruling Kenyan elite. This made the judiciary
an appendage of the Kenyan elite and their politics and ideology. The 2010 Constitution gave birth to other class
antagonism that still continue.
74 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in One-Volume (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998),
reprinted in Ghai, Luckham, and Synder, The Political Economy of Law (Delhi: OUP, 1987) at 40.
75 Ibid at 41.
76
Samir Amin, Only People Make Their Own History: Writings on Capitalism, Imperialism, and Revolution (New
York, Monthly Review Press, 2019). At page 23,1 he writes:”Dialectic relation of infrastructure [base] and
superstructure is also proper to society and has no equivalent to nature. This relation is not unilateral. The
superstructure is not the reflection of the needs of the infrastructure. If this was the case, society would always be
alienated, and it would not be possible to see how it could succeed in liberating itself.”
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class question in politics, and to think of imperialism in terms of race is disastrous. But to neglect
the racial factor as merely incidental is an error only less grave than to make it fundamental.”77
Antonio Gramsci (the Italian school teacher, jailed for ten years in fascist Mussolini’s jail)
developed the theory of the organic intellectual as “the intellectual who, through his [her]
analyses, [her] his visions becomes an indispensable auxiliary of social movements”.78 He
moved the focus from economic relations in society and discussed the essence of politics, culture
and ideology. His analysis has given the whole debate on base and superstructure a different
dynamic. His construct of “ideological hegemony” bears his creativity. In this construct, the
super-structural features like law, religion, education, racism, mass culture assume a new role;
their role is to reinforce class domination so that this domination is not based solely on the state’s
control and use of the machinery of violence.

Let me pause here and remind ourselves that I have in this issue of base and superstructure so far
only quoted European revolutionary thinkers. There are, indeed, many in the African scholarly
tradition who were (or are) great revolutionary thinkers and Marxists. I need not take a roll call
on all of them here, but let me mention Angela Davis, Micere Mugo, Sylvia Tamale, Walter
Rodney, Issa Shivji, Karim Hirji, Yash Tandon, Dani Nabudere, Samir Amin, Ngugi wa
Thiong’o, Wamba dia Wamba, Dorothy Roberts, Horace Campbell, among many others.

Issues of base and superstructure need creative and undogmatic re-analyses given the changing
contexts and circumstance of the world. It should be argued that the dialectical relationship
between the base and superstructure will need creativity, innovation, and lack of dogma in the
varying economic, political, social, ideological, cultural, and intellectual contexts without losing
sight of the original revolutionary messages and expected revolutionary outcomes. Samir Amin
could not have said it better:
According to this perspective, it seems to me necessary to think of renewal of a
creative Marxism. Marx has never been more useful and necessary in order to
understand and transform the world than he is today. Being Marxist in this spirit
is to begin with Marx and not stop with him, or Lenin or Mao, as conceived and
77

C. l. R James, The Black Jacobins, 2nd ed (Secker & Warburg Ltd, 1963) at p. 283.
Ziegler’s Foreword in Yash Tandon, Trade is War: The West’s War Against the World (New York/London:
OR Books, 2015) at xx-xxi.
78Jean
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practiced by the historical Marxists of the previous century. It is to render unto
Marx that which is owed to him: the intelligence to begin a modern critical
thinking, a critique of capitalist reality and a critique of its political, ideological
and cultural representations. A creative Marxism must pursue the goal of
enriching this critical thinking par excellence. It must not fear to integrate all the
input of reflection, in all areas, including those which have wrongly been
considered to be “foreign” by the dogmas of historical Marxisms of the past.79
While still on the issue of relations between base and superstructure, the constitution and law are
part of the superstructure as is politics. The base determines the long movement of history. Most
African states were governed by laws that did not recognize Africans as citizens. In my view
these vital aspects of the superstructure are significant forces in the short to immediate term. I
would add, however, that they play either a progressive or a retrogressive role depending on the
way they are used to fight the base (in our day and age imperialism) or reinforce it. Whether
these aspects play a progressive role, whether they have transformative potential depends on who
uses them and how; and also depends on the quality of political leadership and authentic
opposition in all countries. Judicial leadership is integrated in such leadership. I believe
progressive forces in the Judiciary can use the constitution and law in moving society towards
fundamental transformation. They will do that by developing progressive jurisprudence out of
the constitution and the law, accepting that judicial officers do politics, and that their institution,
the judiciary, is an institutional political actor. They will also have to be conscious of the
limitations of the Constitution and the law that still has its basis in the capitalist system under
imperialism.80

I am not fetishizing the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. No constitution, indeed, should be fetishized.
Indeed, the 2010 Constitution needs to be unmade by the masses of the Kenya people from below.

79

Samir Amin, Long Road to Socialism: Distinguished Nyerere Lecture, 2010 (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota,
2011) at 24-25. Mao Zedong also called for the application of Marxism-Leninism creatively. See also, Matthew
Galway, “Permanent Revolution” in Christian Sorace, Ivan Francheschini and Nicholas Lobere, eds, Afterlives of
Chinese Communism (Acton, Australia: ANU Press & Verso, 2019)181 at 185. See also, Willy Mutunga, “The
Revolutionary Spirit of Amin Lives”, Pambazuka News Voices for Freedom and Justice (24 August, 2018), online:
< https://.Pambazuka.org/Pambazuka-news-special-issue-celebrating-life-and-legacy-Samir-Amin>. 8
80
Roberto Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism 1820-2010: The Engine Room of the Constitution (New
York: OUP, 2013): “…the limits set by the past, the difficulties in overcoming them, and the need to continue to
address the issue today.” at page x.
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On the 10th anniversary of 2010 Constitution, Issa Shivji, the revolutionary socialist Tanzanian
law Professor gave a keynote address in a Webinar in which second edition of my book was
launched.81 The title of his keynote address was “Do Constitutions Matter? The dilemma of a
radical lawyer.” Shivji’s opening paragraph of his keynote address had this reflection:
Constitutions don’t make revolutions. Revolutions make constitutions. No
constitution envisages its own death for that is what a revolution entails. But
constitutions matter. Some of the finest constitutions have been erected on ugly
socio-economic formations wrought with extreme inequalities and inequities.
South Africa and Kenya are examples. But constitutions do matter. Constitutions
rarely herald fundamental transformations. They are
the product of major
transformations to consolidate the new status quo. Yet constitutions do matter.
Why do constitutions matter? Why do we need constitutions?
Shivji, in his keynote, sought to address radical lawyers – the “sincere, well-intentioned and selfsacrificing lawyers who are motivated by their passion for social justice and fight for the rights,
dignity and livelihoods of the working people.” He instructs radical lawyers that “a constitution
is as much a political document as it is a legal document. It is a power map.” He also adds that a
constitution is an ideological document. He pleads with radical lawyers “to recognize the limits
of bourgeois law and constitutions.” He argues that while a constitution is a terrain of struggle its
implementation entails going beyond that assertion to identify the sites of struggle. And in
transformative constitutions which have rights as abstract demands, these can be made political
demands for the right to live with dignity and the right to decent livelihood. Demands should be
made of the state for commons (land, water, under-ground and over ground natural resources,
education, health and sanitation, housing, energy, communications and finance) to be decommodified and de-privatized. “In other words, for the working people to reclaim the commons
and liberate themselves from the clutches of monopoly finance capital assisted by our comprador
states.”
Shivji’s uses and limitations of transformative constitutions dovetails to the discussion of ‘ordinary
revolutions’ by Samir Amin. In his book82 (at page 17) he writes:
81

Willy Mutunga, Constitution Making from the Middle: Civil Society and Transitional Politics in Kenya, 19921997, 2nd ed (Nairobi: Strathmore University Press, 2020).
82
Samir Amin,The Word We Wish to See: Revolutionary Objectives in the Twenty-First Century (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 2008).

30
Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2021

25

The Transnational Human Rights Review, Vol. 8 [2021], Art. 2

The ‘great revolutions’ are distinguished by the fact that they project themselves
far in front of the present, towards the future, in opposition to the others (the
‘ordinary revolutions’) which are content to respond to the necessity for
transformation that are on the agenda of the moment.83
I believe Shivji’s address challenges us to debate, historicize, and problematize the viability of
‘ordinary revolutions’ as paths to the ‘great revolutions.” I have argued that it depends on the
political leadership (and its political party) that undertakes that task. Transformative
constitutions, however progressive, will never be implemented by our comprador bourgeoise in
our Global South. Our experience in Kenya confirms this. The comprador bourgeoisie in Kenya
has fought tooth and nail to clawback the fundamental pillars of our progressive constitution. We
also witness robust resistance to this project of the comprador bourgeoisie. The resistance by
social movements and radical political parties under the banner of “respect, protect, and uphold
the Constitution/Tekeleza na Kuilinda Katiba” are about the development of alternative political
leadership that will implement the strengths of the Constitution and be one to audit its
weaknesses for future amendments.84

Shivji sees constitutions as products of major transformations to consolidate the status quo.
There is also another side to this coin. If they consolidate the status quo through concessions and
mitigation of the evils of the status quo (as history records this does happen) is this a great
opportunity for radical political leaderships and their radical political parties, backed by radical
and revolutionary movements of the people, to use these concessions subversively as a basis of
further moments toward ‘great revolution?’ I have always found Rosa Luxemburg’s brilliant
essay85 insightful in this regard.

So, the 2010 Constitution matters because we are locked up in struggle during the last 10 years
of its implementation. It allows us to organize and mobilize in the sites that Shivji identifies. It is

83

Samir Amin identifies “great revolutions” to include the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, the
Chinese Revolution, Cuban Revolution, and the Vietnamese Revolution.
84
Such movements as Kongomano la Mageuzi Movement, Linda Katiba Movement, social justice centres, artist,
gay, and environmental movements are at the centre of this resistance. So are the radical political parties Ukweli
Party, Communist Party of Kenya, and United Green Movement.
85 “Reform or Revolution” in Helen Scott, ed, The Essential Rosa Luxemburg (Chicago: Haymarket books, 2008) at
41-104.

30
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/thr/vol8/iss1/2

26

Mutunga: Transformative Constitutions and Constitutionalism : A New Theory

the one that has breathed life into robust public interest litigation in the constitutional and legal
struggles. It has allowed us to make a clarion call for the contestation of political power that is
different and alternative to that of the comprador bourgeoisie. It matters because it is the basis of
various struggles by the youth and women that it has decreed. In providing for devolution, it
matters because it has captured the imagination of Kenyans that land and natural resources, and
political power, can be equitably shared in a better democratic society. It allows us to debate how
our new politics should be organized, how to build integrity in the various leaderships of our
society. It matters because its implementation will usher in further struggles for an even better
society.

(xi)
Social Class Struggles in Constitution-Making
In the case of constitution-making in Kenya there was robust public participation. Although led
by liberal and progressive middle-class groups (lawyers, human rights activists, progressive
clergy, and opposition politicians) the process was consultative and the drafts reflected the
integrity of what the Kenyan people wanted in their overall economic, social, and cultural
developments; and the fulfillment of the promise of democracy.86 The class struggles occurred
among elite (intra-class struggles), the middle classes, and the working class. The consensus
reached reflected class concessions made in a status quo that was unacceptable and
unsustainable. Although the 2010 Constitution addressed issues of governance, social, justice,
national values, gender, equitable distribution of resources it still left intact capitalistic relations
of production (including in international law) pertaining to the protection of private property
(national and foreign). It did, however, bring class antagonisms to the surface as the
implementation of the Constitution started and continued.

There was the issue of whether the Kenyan elite could implement a progressive social
democratic constitution raising sharply the issue of the development of alternative political
leadership.87 There remains the issue whether in the hands of progressive alternative political
86

Mutunga, supra note 82.; See also Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, “The Final Report on the
Constitution Commission of Kenya” (11 October 2010), online: Katiba Institute
http://www.katibainstitute.org/Archives/images/CKRC;.
87
Professor Kivutha Kibwana, the Governor of the Makueni County that is a beacon of progressive implementation
of the Constitution, used the metaphor of the birth of a beautiful baby to describe the birth of the 2010 Constitution
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leadership, be it progressive, radical or revolutionary, the implementation will lay a firm
foundation for fundamental transformation out of the grasp of capitalism and imperialism. I see
this as involving the mobilization and organization of the Kenyan people around the centrality of
their will in the Constitution and struggles against the limitations of the Constitution in the quest
to build a socialist society. All these questions are located and reflected in various arenas of
struggle, the Judiciary being one of them.

(xii) The Constitution is not Insular but operates within the Context of a World System
The jurisprudence that is developed and its attendant judicial politics operates within the context
of current world systems undergirding the entire planet. Transformative constitutions and
constitutionalism also operate within these world systems, the imperialism of the West and the
East. The transformation of the planet is entwined with these transformations that come from the
Global South.88 In my view, transformative constitutions and constitutionalism provide a terrain
of struggle that interrogates, historicizes, problematizes, and debates other schools of
jurisprudence. These transformative constitutions and constitutionalism, I argue, have their own
unique and enriching niche in those developments.

of Kenya. He went on to say it was tragic that we handed over the baby to a Kenyan elite that traffics in babies and
baby parts to oversee the baby’s upbringing! The current Kenyan elite cannot implement the Constitution. Indeed, it
has been involved in destroying the major pillars of the Constitution. The good news is that we continue to resist
continuously and consistently these unpatriotic machinations by this ruling class.
88 Hirji, supra note 70 at pages 253-254: “The fundamental root of the major problems people everywhere face is
neoliberal, imperial capitalism, a system characterized by corporate domination of the economy and society, a vast
wealth gap between those at the top and the broad majority, the division of the world between affluent and povertystricken nations, a plutocratic or symbolic form of democracy and, of recent, trends toward fascism. Integral to them
are imperialistic conduct by the rich nations and entrenchment of social and economic dependency in the poor
nations…The transformative strategy has to [be] systemic, namely, to organize to overturn, nationally and globally,
the capitalist, imperial domination and work towards attaining a society based on social and economic equality,
grassroots democracy, social justice, mutual trust and cooperation, full accountability and total non-violence. In its
place, we need to strive for a society based on respect for the dignity and rights of all minority and majority groups.
And their struggles ought to be integrated within the overall transformative strategy. It is not a question of fighting
capitalism first and then dealing with racism but of the recognizing the two problems as sides of the same coin and
confronting both simultaneously…The struggles against capitalism and imperialism need a broad based united front
of the commoners, the working people, the exploited and the disadvantaged, that is, the 99% who presently are
divided into disparate groups and subgroups. The process of attaining a peaceful, just coalition between these groups
and the majority should be a democratic, consultative process based on mutual respect.”
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Let me begin with Eric Hobsbawm’s conclusion that “Our world risks both explosion and
implosion. It must change.”89 For centuries the world has debated the content and consequences
of this change. In the last quarter of the 20th Century the Cold War ended, the Soviet Empire
collapsed, and neoliberalism did not fare well and continues to fare badly after the financial
meltdown of 2007-2008 that shook the notion that neoliberalism was the end of history. So, the
paradigms of neoliberalism (imperialism of the West and East), socialism, and communism, still
robustly engage our intellectualism, ideology, politics, and economics; our social, cultural,
ecological, and spiritual humanities. When operational the World Social Forum was convinced
since its inception that a new world was possible. The Forum invoked radical paradigms in its
mobilization, organization, and its broad radical intellectual pursuits.90

At some point, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, radical social democracy
anchored in the paradigms of human rights and social justice, was viewed as the basis of
debating fundamental restructuring of societies. Quickly we found the limitations of these
paradigms. Revolutionary change rather reformist transformation, the latter in effect reinforcing
the status quo, has never been discarded in these debates. For example, is it possible to argue that
such transformation can be a basis of revolutionary change? These debates have their long
historical roots that have rich sources.91 The broad consensus to this question is clearly in the
affirmative.
89

Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), at
585.
90 Tom Mertes, A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible? (New York: Verso, 2004). See also,
Samir Amin, The Long Revolution of the Global South: Towards a New Anti-Imperialist International (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 2019), ch 7 and Manifesto of the World Forum for Alternatives at pages 433-36.
91 See for example, Samir Amin, Long Road to Socialism: Distinguished Nyerere Lecturer, 2010 (Dar es Salaam:
Mkuki na Nyota, 2011); Samir Amin, Russia and the Long Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 2016); Yash Tandon, Trade is War: The West’s War Against the World (London: OR Books,
2015); Tariq Ali, The Dilemmas of Lenin: Terrorism, War, Empire, Love, Revolution (London: Verso, 2017); Eric
Hobsbawm, How to Change the World: Tales of Marx, and Marxism (London: Abacus, 2012); Paul D’Amato, The
Meaning of Marxism (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2014): Walter Rodney, The Russian Revolution: A view from the
Third World, ed by Jessee Benjamin and Robin D.G. Kelley (London: Verso, 2018); Rosa Luxemburg, “Reform or
Revolution” in Hellen Scott,ed, The Essential Rosa Luxemburg (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008) 41; Tamas
Krausz, Reconstructing Lenin: An Intellectual Biography (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2015); Sorace,
Fracheschini & Loubere, Afterlives of Chinese Communism, supra note 62; Dani Nabudere, A Critique of the
Political Economy of Social Imperialism (mimeo) (Hensinghor, Denmark, 1989); and Albert Einstein, “Why
Socialism?” (May 1949/May 1998) Monthly Rev,. Einstein wrote: “I am convinced there is one way to eliminate
these grave evils [of capitalism], namely through the establishment of a socialist economy, accompanied by an
educational system which would be oriented toward social goals. In such an economy, the means of production are
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III
Conclusion: Do we have a new Theory and School of Jurisprudence from the Global
South?
Let this debate begin. Ultimately, I see in this theory, this school of jurisprudence (and its
various ingredients reflecting a merger of progressive, radical, and revolutionary paradigms
discussed here, and that can be invoked by social movements and political parties 92) developing
under transformative constitutions, as our contribution from the Global South. It is a theory, a
school of jurisprudence, we need to export into all discussions that continue in search of how
constitutions, the law, and the judiciaries could be instruments of transformation and revolution.

Under transformative constitutions, judiciaries, Judicial officers and their jurisprudence (that
owes its content from the judicial officers, the bar associations, public and organic intellectuals,
other disciplines whose various ingredients have been discussed) are not devoid of ideology and
politics. Judicial officers do politics under such constitutions. They know that these
transformative constitutions laid down ideologies and politics in societies. The constitutions and
law are instruments of change. The Judiciaries are institutional political actors. Clearly
judiciaries and their judicial officers participate in struggles for either social reform or reformism
(the latter being the mitigation of the existing status quo) through the development of
jurisprudence. In the case of Kenya, which is the pivotal case study in answering the question
posed in the title to this article, the Judiciary and judicial officers are in practice involved in
either social reform or reformism. The former could form a basis for the struggles to a society
envisaged below.

Transformation, change or revolution is, therefore, fundamentally a political problem borne out
of systems that ruling political classes create. A system that puts property and profits before the

owned by society itself and are utilized in a planned fashion. A planned economy, which adjusts production to the
needs of the community, would distribute the work to be done by among all those able to work and would guarantee
a livelihood to every man, woman, and child. The education of the individual, in addition to promoting his own
innate abilities, would attempt to develop in him a sense of responsibility for his fellow men in place of the
glorification of power and success in our present society.” P 7, Einstein warned that a planned economy was not yet
socialism; that the centralization of political and economy power in the bureaucracy could make it a class for itself
and endanger the rights of the individual. The former Soviet Union fell into this trap.
92
Radical social movements and radical leftist political parties (UKWELI Party is a radical social democratic party;
United Green Movement is supports ecologically safe environment; the Communist Party of Kenya (CPK) is
ideologically on the left of the first two but finds in the 2010 Constitution firm bases for its mobilization and
organization of the masses of the Kenyan people. All these parties find in the Constitution great sites for developing
new politics and building a basis for alternative political leadership in Kenya.)
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people, as indeed, the capitalist system can never be bereft of inhuman inequalities, poverty, and
the denial of material needs of the majority. The existing self-claimed socialist systems also face
similar problems within their systems because they do not operate outside the current imperialist
systems. This is the reason there exists today consistent and continuous debates the world over
about what will replace the current unacceptable and unsustainable global status quo. I believe
that global citizens must seek to build a free, just, humane, peaceful, non-militaristic, nonviolent, non-racist, non-ethnic, gender just, non-sexist, equitable, ecologically safe, and a
prosperous democratic socialist society on the planet. This global socialist commonwealth can
only be realized through solidarity struggles of global citizens93 under their revolutionary
political leadership in the South and North.94 Samir Amin has given us a pathway to this global
socialist commonwealth.95

93

One of Africa’s organic and public revolutionary intellectuals Karim Hirji has placed this responsibility of the
shoulders of the African youth in the following words: “African liberation has to be founded on three basic
principles: socialism, regional cooperation and regional self-reliance. Instead of being mired in seeking solutions
within the confines of the current neoliberal system, African youth must have bold dreams and think in terms of
fundamental transformation. That was the vision of the radicals of the earlier era, and it is a vision that the youth of
today must adopt…The technological capacity to resolve all the critical problems facing humanity have been present
at least for half century. But it is the strangle-hold of the rich and the powerful classes and nations over the state,
politics, media, thought process that have prevented that capacity from being utilized.” Supra note 70 at page 241.
Yash Tandon emphasizes the role a “vanguard party that can mobilize the people to bury their internal (religious,
regional, sectarian) differences to fight the Euro-American Empire and its local agents.” in "The common people of
Sudan at a strategic crossroad”, Pambazuka News (24 April, 2019), online: <www.pambazuka.org>. One needs to
add within that Empire Japan. And not forget China as an emerging Empire.
94
Paul Robeson, “…the time seems long past when people can afford to think exclusively in terms of national
units..”quoted in Gerald Horne & Paul Robeson, The Artist as Revolutionary (London: Pluto Press, 2016) at 52.
95
Sorace, Francheschini & Loubere, supra note 62. This book has a rich discussion on the legacy, and lessons of the
Chinese socialism and communism. Discussions on socialist law, permanent revolution, world revolution, political
leadership, where political power resides, and who are the people in whose name revolution is waged are
illuminating. See also the last written words of Amin in Samir Amin & Firoze Manji, “Toward the Formation of a
Transnational Alliance of Working and Oppressed Peoples” (July-August, 2019) 71:3 Monthly Rev 120. These 6
pages discuss contemporary imperialism and its current state. The Transnational Alliance of Working and Oppressed
Peoples of the World evolves as planetary political organization that must struggle against contemporary
imperialism. This alliance must consolidate the gains of the World Social Forum, rescue its weaknesses. Within this
global solidarity national and regional chapters of the Alliance will clarify their intellectual, ideological, and
political roles as required by the Alliance. See also Karim Hirji, supra note 70.
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